Last Friday the US Treasury intervened in the market for Japanese yen in partnership with the bank of Japan. That sounds a bit weird though, the idea that the United States Treasury would intervene in someone else's currency. The Treasury spent about $59 billion buying the Japanese yen and the bank of Japan joined in, buying about $37 billion worth of yen. The obvious question here is, why does the Treasury care so much about the value of the Japanese yen? So let's answer a few questions. No. 1, why did the US intervene to save the yen? No. 2, why does the US care about the value of the yen? Let's get into it. Hi, my name is Henry. I'm a former wealth manager and economist, now based in Switzerland. First, we need to cover a small history lesson. Why has the yen been sliding for decades and why are the Bank of Japan's interest rates at near zero? During the 1980s, Japan was utterly booming. There were many stories even about Japan overtaking the United States in terms of GDP. But what was brewing under the hood was one of the largest land value bubbles in all of human history. As a good example of how crazy it got, the land under the Imperial Palace in Tokyo, Japan in the 1980s, when Tokyo's Imperial Palace was worth more than California and golf club membership could cost US$3 million - 5 crazy facts about the bubble economy. Japan was eventually worth more than all of the property in California combined, which is clearly quite insane. And the market realized that in 1990, when the entire Japanese market blew up. When the dust settled, the land returned to more reasonable values. But the debt that people had taken against it was still there. And so since 1990, Japan has had what we call a balance sheet recession, which is the excessive amount of debt against an asset that's deflated. People have then chosen instead to pay down their debts rather than go and spend in the economy, go fund consumption and go invest. Now, to try and fix that, the Bank of Japan set its interest rate benchmark at zero and even has been negative during this period. Now, in trying to combat its domestic balance sheet recession, it created the biggest carry trade on earth. And the process is simple: investors could borrow from the Bank of Japan at near zero rates. They could then swap it out of the yen, go buy say US dollars and buy any other asset, including even US T-bills. So they could borrow at 0% and then they could earn 5% in interest. And this money is flooded into any asset you can think of, whether it's foreign real estate, US equities, US Treasuries, corporate bonds. And it was basically free money for as long as you thought the Bank of Japan was gonna keep its interest rates at near zero. And as long as you didn't think the yen was gonna do anything crazy. It was essentially free. Essentially, the entire carry trade is short the Japanese yen and short Japanese yields. The risk here is only that when you want to go and repay your loan, you have to go swap it out, whatever currency you have your asset in, swap it back into yen to go pay back the debt. Now, estimates of the size of this carry trade are very varied. The conservative estimate is somewhere between one to two trillion dollars. And on the highest end, the craziest one I've seen is $20 trillion. This trade has allowed investors to nearly print free money for about 30 years. The big problem, however, is how this affects Japan's domestic market. Japan is a pretty normal developed economy. It imports many, many things from around the world, including quite a lot of food. And so it's a very difficult balancing act. If you let the Japanese yen fall too quickly, all of those imports become incredibly expensive for the Japanese people, which obviously is not a fantastic result. And that's partially why the Japanese government wanted to intervene. Already, the Japanese yen was falling off a cliff, and its domestic consumers were already feeling the pinch from the imported inflation. On the other side of this difficult channel is that if you let the yen rise too quickly, all of those loans that everyone took in Japanese yen, they have to get repaid from foreign currencies and now more expensive. And this is where you can potentially get a forced unwind. Because imagine, in the case that this $20 trillion in foreign assets, all sees that the Bank of Japan is either raising rates or that the yen is increasing. If they all try and exit their positions at the same time, they sell those assets and then try and buy the yen, the value of the yen starts to skyrocket. All of their loans become more expensive to repay yet again. And that's when things get pretty choppy. And we've already seen this happen back in 2024. In August, the Bank of Japan in August 2024 surprised the markets by raising its reference rate from 0.1% to 0.25%. They all started trying to unwind their positions, selling the asset and going back to buy the yen to repay their debts in yen. And the Japanese yen went up 14% in just 3 weeks. And the effect on the market was brutal, because of course, in the carry trade unwinding, they were selling these foreign assets to try and pay the loans back. The Nikkei stock index fell 12.4% in a single day, the worst day since Black Monday in 1987. Other global markets had similar effects of rapid sell-offs. The VIX index, which is an indication of the volatility in the market, usually it's used as like a fear index, almost shot up to sixty-five, which is an insane reading. And that was only from a 15 basis point jump. The Japanese yen is in a very delicate corridor. If it falls too fast, you ruin the domestic economy in Japan, and they import a lot of inflation. But if it rises too quickly, it causes a forced unwind of the largest carry trade in human history. Now, the big question: why did the US specifically intervene in the Japanese yen? It knew that the Bank of Japan would want to intervene to protect the value of the yen from falling too quickly. But to intervene, the Bank of Japan would have to sell a number of its assets to then go buy the yen. And here's the critical part: The Bank of Japan is one of the largest foreign holders of US Treasuries at about $1.2 trillion. And so, in essence, for the Bank of Japan to defend the yen, it would have to go and sell some of its assets. That would be a very big chunk of US Treasuries. And of course, these are bonds. And so if you dump a huge amount of supply and the price goes down, the effective yield on those Treasuries goes up. The yields on US bonds are already pretty high, partially from sticky inflation and partially from the difficulties with the Iran war. So while the Treasury Department came out and suggested this was an act of friendship between allied nations, in reality, it was more of a targeted move to assist the Japanese so they wouldn't have to dump all the US Treasuries. It, in fact, opened a repo facility, a short-term lending facility against Japan's bonds, so we wouldn't have to sell them. They could just send them to the Fed and borrow money against them in dollars. The difficulty here is not a two-body problem of Japan and its domestic market versus the international carry trade. It's actually a three-body problem. This creates another difficulty in the world of international finance because with this three-body problem, you're essentially just picking the loser. And your choices include the domestic consumers in Japan, the carry trade that is going on internationally, that would unwind nearly every asset market or the US Treasuries market. And that's not a particularly pleasant choice to make. And so, so far, there hasn't been a structured unwind. But right now, the eyes of the world are on the Bank of Japan and the value of the yen.